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Peterson: High Stakes and Low Tides: The Fourth Circuit Gambles by Forbiddi

HIGH STAKES AND LOW TIDES: THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
GAMBLES BY FORBIDDING RIVERBOAT CASINOS IN
CASINO VENTURES v. STEWART
I.

INTRODUCTION

"In the casino the cardinal rule is: keep them playing and keep
them coming back. The longer they play, the more they lose ...in
the end, we get it all."' This quote, from the movie Casino, exempli2
fies the reasons legislators vote for or against legalizing gambling.
Legalized gambling is a rapidly growing industry in the United
States, and gambling laws are becoming increasingly liberal. 3 Proponents of gambling insist that gambling-based enterprises create
jobs, invigorate economies, increase tourism and generate tax revenues.4 In contrast, opponents of legalizing gambling contend that
gambling increases crime, creates traffic congestion, and with tourists flooding the casinos, actually decreases the profits in existing
tourist and restaurant facilities. 5 Riverboat gambling is among the
6
types of gambling that have rapidly expanded in the past decade.
It has emerged as one of the most popular types of gaming activi1. CASINO (MCA/Universal 1995).
2. See Paul D. Delva, Comment, The Promises and Perils of Legalized Gamblingfor
Local Governments: Who Decides How to Stack the Deck? 68 TEMP. L. REV. 847, 847-49,
873 nn.2-3 (1995) (noting advantages and disadvantages of legalizing gambling).
3. See id. at 84748 (noting that trend of liberalizing gambling laws is due to
efforts of state legislatures to create source of economic revitalization in their states
and is likely to continue). See generally ROBERT GOODMAN, LEGALIZED GAMBLING AS
A STRATEGY FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 6 (1994) (noting that legalized gambling
is one of America's fastest growing industries); I. Nelson Rose, Gambling and the
Law - Update 1993, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.L.J. 93, 94 (1992) (same).
4. See Delva, supra note 2, at 847 (explaining that gambling's impact caused it
to become most popular issue in general elections in 1994).
5. See id. at 848, 873 n.9 (stating that opponents to Philadelphia riverboat
gambling proposal fear local restaurants and pubs would be adversely affected because casinos offer cheaper meals and complimentary alcoholic beverages to
patrons).
6. See Casino Ventures v. Stewart, 23 F. Supp. 2d 647, 648 (D.S.C. 1998) (defining riverboat cruise's main purpose as offering gambling to those aboard, once
vessel is beyond state's territorial waters); William Blake Bennett, Waterborne Woes:
Legal Difficulties of Riverboat Gaming in EmergingJurisdictions,NEV. LAw., Feb. 1995, at
19 (noting, "riverboat gambling has been one of the principal means of expansion
of the gaming industry into new jurisdictions in the early 1990's [sic]"); see also 15
U.S.C.A. § 1175 (1994) (defining "riverboat gambling" and "cruises to nowhere" as
using gambling device on vessel in which voyage begins and ends in same state or
United States possession and does not make any intervening stops within boundaries of another state).

(397)
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ties. 7 As a result, the question arises as to which government, state
or federal, should regulate riverboat gambling. 8 Regulating
riverboat gambling is often a shared power between federal and
state/local governments; as a result, a problem arises when federal
and state and/or local gambling regulations contradict or conflict
with one another. This debate centers around a state's authority to
regulate the health, safety and welfare of its citizens by exercising its
police powers balanced against the federal government's authority
to preempt state laws through the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution.9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed this debate between state police powers and the federal
Supremacy Clause doctrine in Casino Ventures v. Stewart.10 The
Fourth Circuit held that federal law did not preempt South Carolina's general gambling prohibitions, as South Carolina's law
prohibiting gambling did not specifically address riverboat gambling.1" This Note suggests that although South Carolina had a
general prohibition on gambling, 12 federal law, in fact, preempted
state prohibitions.1 3 Section II of this Note will set forth the facts in
the Casino Ventures case.' 4 Section III will address the major issues
7. See Bennett, supra note 6, at 19 (arguing that, "enabling legislation for
riverboat gaming has been passed in Illinois, Iowa, Mississippi, Louisiana, Missouri,
and Indiana, and some sixty riverboat casinos are now in operation in the United
States").
8. For an analysis of the questions that surface because of these shared powers, see infra notes 95-106 and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of the federal supremacy clause and its interaction with
state police power, see infra notes 82-87 and accompanying text; see also S. Candice
Hoke, TranscendingConventional Supremacy: A Reconstruction of the Supremacy Clause,
24 CONN. L. REv. 829 n.2 (noting that Supreme Court has witnessed dramatic increase in cases arising under Supremacy Clause). Hoke illustrated her claim that
Supremacy Clause suits have increased by listing twenty-seven cases in the 19871990 Supreme Court terms where the majority opinion invoked the Supremacy
Clause. Id. Hoke also argued that the Supreme Court has "invoked the Supremacy
Clause at a dramatic rate of increase during the post-World War II era." Id. at 830
n.5. She summarized the increase as follows: during the period 1946-1949 five
cases invoked the clause (1.25 cases per year average); during 1950-1959 seventeen
cases invoked the clause (1.7 cases per year average); during 1960-1969 forty cases
invoked the clause (four cases per year average); during 1970-1979 fifty-seven cases
invoked the clause (5.7 cases per year average); during 1980-1989 eighty-three
cases invoked the clause (8.3 cases per year average). Id.
10. 183 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 1999).
11. See id. at 310.
12. For a discussion of South Carolina's gambling laws, see infra notes 72-79
and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion on the applicability of federal preemption to the Casino
Ventures decision, see infra notes 163-85 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the facts of Casino Ventures, see infra notes 19-27 and
accompanying text.
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involved in the Casino Ventures case, including federal preemption
of state law, the Johnson Act, and South Carolina gambling laws. 15
Section IV will analyze the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Casino Ventures and the precedents upon which it based its decision. 1 6 Section
V will critically assess the holding of Casino Ventures in light of other
circuits' decisions as well as Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning the Johnson Act and federal preemption of state law. 17 Section
VI will conclude with a prediction of the impact of the Casino Ventures holding upon both South Carolina and federal law.1 8
II.

FAcTs

Casino Ventures, a Florida company, planned to operate
riverboat cruises with gambling facilities from a South Carolina
dock. 19 In July 1998, Casino Ventures sought a declaration that federal law had preempted South Carolina's gambling laws. 20 Casino
Ventures purpose for doing so was to avoid prosecution under
South Carolina's strict prohibition of many forms of gambling
within its borders. 21 Although Casino Ventures had not yet begun
navigating its gambling cruises, the company feared that South Carolina would consider the cruises' operation a violation of its state
gambling prohibitions. 2 2 In asserting its right to operate day
cruises, Casino Ventures relied on a federal statute, the Johnson
15. For a discussion of the background of the Casino Ventures decision, see
infra notes 28-79 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the narrative analysis, see infra notes 80-119 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the critical analysis, see infra notes 120-85 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the impact of the Casino Ventures decision see infra
notes 186-98 and accompanying text.
19. See Casino Ventures v. Stewart, 183 F.3d 307, 308 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating
that Casino Ventures' business entailed cruises departing from and returning to
same South Carolina port with no intervening stops).
20. See id. at 309 (explaining that Casino Ventures feared its business would
violate South Carolina gambling laws). The circuit court noted that the district
court found state gambling laws had been preempted. Id.; Casino Ventures v.
Stewart, 23 F. Supp. 2d (D.S.C. 1998) (stating that Johnson Act's plain language
permitting riverboat gambling coupled with South Carolina's lack of statute forbidding riverboat gambling permitted Casino Ventures to operate business in South
Carolina).
21. For a discussion of South Carolina's gambling prohibitions, see infranotes
72-79 and accompanying text.
22. See Casino Ventures, 183 F.3d at 309 (stating, "Casino Ventures alleges that
its business operations may violate South Carolina's ban on lotteries, S.C. Code
Ann. §§ 16-19-10 to -30, its ban on unlawful games and betting, id. §§ 16-19-40, 1619-130, and its ban on the possession and use of gaming tables and machines, id.
§§ 12-21-2710, 12-21-2712, 16-19-50, 16-19-120.").
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23
Act, and argued that federal law preempted South Carolina law.

Specifically, Casino Ventures claimed legal exercise of its gambling
cruises under the Johnson Act's 1994 Amendments. 2 4 The district
court held that under these amendments, South Carolina law was
preempted because (1) the amendments created a "federal right to
operate day cruises, thereby conflicting with state laws" and (2) although the state "could defeat preemption if it 'ha[d] enacted a
statute the terms of which prohibit that repair or use' on cruises to
nowhere[,]" South Carolina's gambling laws were not passed after
the 1994 Amendments took effect, and therefore did not meet the
statutory requirement because South Carolina law did not specifically reference the Johnson Act or riverboat gambling. 25 After the
United States District Court of South Carolina (Charleston Division) held that South Carolina law was preempted, state officials
appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. 26 The Fourth Circuit overturned the district court's finding that the Johnson Act
27
preempted state law.

23. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1175 (1994). The Johnson Act generally restricted gambling within the United States. See id. § 1175(a) (stating Act's general rule forbade
gambling in United States). However, the Act also included exceptions that Congress created. See id. § 1175(b) (noting exceptions). Casino Ventures relied upon
these exceptions for its assertion that it was permitted to operate day cruises from
South Carolina. See Casino Ventures, 183 F.3d at 309 (stating Act no longer prohibited gambling unless state in which ship's voyage begins and ends expressly forbade "cruise[s] to nowhere").
24. See Casino Ventures, 183 F.3d at 309 (stating, "section 1175 [of the Johnson
Act] no longer restricts the transport and possession of gambling devices on vessels, provided that those devices are not used while the vessel is within the boundaries of a state or possession of the United States... [and] no longer prohibits the
repair and use of gambling devices outside of those boundaries, unless the ship is
on a cruise to nowhere and the state in which that cruise 'begins and ends has
enacted a statute the terms of which prohibit that repair or use on that voyage.'")
(citations omitted).
25. See Casino Ventures, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 649 (holding that federal law permitted Casino Ventures to operate gambling day cruises from South Carolina's
shores).
26. See Casino Ventures, 183 F.3d at 310 (stating as grounds for appeal that
state gambling laws were directed at governing health, welfare, safety and morals of
South Carolina's citizens, which qualified as valid exercise of state police power).
27. See id. at 308 (holding that "[Johnson] Act does not preempt state regulatory authority over gambling [and as a result] . . .South Carolina authorities remain free to enforce state criminal prohibitions against illicit gambling cruise
activity.").
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III.

BACKGROUND

This section will discuss the major issues in the Casino Ventures
case. These issues include preemption, 2 8 the Johnson Act, 29 and
30
South Carolina's gambling laws.
A.

Preemption

Under the United States Constitution, the Supremacy Clause
dictates that the Constitution and federal laws "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding."' 3 1 Preemption is the notion that
federal law will take precedence over state law; it is based on the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.3 2 Preemption
is also based upon early Supreme Court case law.3 3 Preemption is

not a power that the federal government employs without discre28. For a discussion of the preemption issue, see infra notes 31-59 and accompanying text.
29. For a discussion of the Johnson Act, see infra notes 60-71 and accompanying text.
30. For a discussion of South Carolina's gambling laws, see infra notes 72-79
and accompanying text.
31. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
32. See Hawkins v. Leslie's Pool Mart, Inc., 184 F.3d 244, 247 (3d Cir. 1999)
(holding that "[p] reemption is based on the Supremacy Clause ....[t]he doctrine
preempts state laws that conflict with or are contrary to federal law.") (citations
omitted); see alSOJOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSITUTIONAL LAW
§ 9.1 (4th ed. 1991) (stating, "[t]he supremacy clause mandates that federal law
overrides, i.e., preempts, any state regulation where there is an actual conflict between the two sets of legislation such that both cannot stand . . ."); Hoke, supra

note 9, at 871-75 (stating that Constitutional Convention adopted preemption
standard that bound all judges, both state and national, to principle that "Laws of
the United States" were supreme, reinforced idea that both state and federal
courts would function under same obligation to enforce national law and emphasized that state law had to be "contrary" to federal law in order to warrant its
preemption).
33. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824) (stating that
"the law of the State, though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted,
must yield" [when incompatible with federal legislation]); McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 327 (1819) (holding that "[t]he laws of the United States,
then, made in pursuance of the constitution, are to be the supreme law of the
land, anything in the laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."). In addition, Chief Justice Marshall stated in McCulloch that,
Nothing can be plainer than that, if the law of Congress . . . be a

constitutional act, it must have its full and complete effects. Its operation
cannot be either defeated or impeded by acts of State legislation. To
hold otherwise, would be to declare, that Congress can only exercise its
constitutional powers subject to the controlling discretion, and under the
sufferance, of the State governments.
Id. at 330.
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don; it adheres to self-imposed guidelines and safeguards in order
to avoid upsetting the balance of state and federal powers.3 4 One
such safeguard is assessing the congressional intent of a law before
finding preemption, providing, "We must assume that the balance
between federal and state law will not be disturbed 'unintentionally
by Congress or unnecessarily by the courts.'" 3 5 However, not all
36
instances of preemption are the same.
There are three types of preemption: express, implied and
conflict.3 7 Placing one instance of preemption into one of the
three categories is difficult because each instance of preemption is
3
highly case sensitive.

8

34. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (noting
presumption against finding preemption of state police powers) (citation omitted); see also McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 338 (stating that Supreme Court strives to find
"harmony of action" between state and federal governments and tries to prevent
conflict between them); Fed'n of Adver. Indus. Representatives, Inc. v. City of
Chicago, 189 F.3d 633, 637 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting presumption that "Congress
does not cavalierly preempt state law causes of action ... when Congress legislates
in areas traditionally occupied by the historic police powers of the state.");
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The PoliticalEconomy of CooperativeFederalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "DualSovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REv. 813, 831 (1998)
(stating, "there is a long constitutional tradition maintaining that Congress cannot
force state officials to implement federal law ....

[b]ut, on the other hand....

[t] he fundamental assumption of [Federalist] reasoning during the ratification debates... is that state governments are unfit to implement federal law because state
officials are devious, demagogic, untrustworthy, parochial, and inherently rebellious and, therefore, ought to be excluded entirely from implementing federal
policy.").
35. See Worm v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 970 F.2d 1301, 1305 (4th Cir. 1992)
(holding that in area of law such as product liability law, which has its roots in state
law remedies, court must be certain of congressional intent to preempt so as to
preserve balance of power between state and federal law) (quoting Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)); see also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,
75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (warning that judicial activism may erode
legislative power by supplanting judicial opinions for legislative intent); NowAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 32, at 314 (stating that even if congressional intent is not
expressly stated in statute or Congress did not expressly preempt, intent to preempt may be inferred from danger of conflict between state and federal law, necessity of uniformity, or pervasiveness of federal regulation over particular area of
law).
36. For an introduction to the three types of federal preemption, see infra
notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
37. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983) (stating that Congress may preempt expressly through explicit terms, implicitly by pervasive "scheme of federal regulation" that leaves no room for state to supplement, and implicitly if state law
conflicts with federal law to point where complying with both laws would be impossible or where state law acts as obstacle to congressional objectives).
38. See Hawkins v. Leslie's Pool Mart, Inc., 184 F.3d 244, 247 (3d Cir. 1999)
(noting that three preemption categories are not "rigidly distinct") (citations omitted); see also NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 32, at 312 (stating that preemption
analysis is subject to "judicial ad hoc balancing," and "it is difficult to apply the
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1. Express Preemption
If a federal law expressly preempts state law, a federal statute
will state explicitly that it is preempting any state law on the same
issue. 39 Courts begin with two presumptions when assessing
whether express preemption exists. 40 The first presumption is that
the states' historic police powers should not be supplanted by federal law unless that was the clear intent of Congress. 41 "The protection of state institutional autonomy is a matter of deep concern to
federal courts . . . [and] federal courts have become increasingly

reluctant to interfere with state enforcement of state laws in state
courts and administrative agencies." 42 In this respect, judges are
especially reluctant to impose their opinions on the law. 43 The second presumption is that determining congressional intent is essential in every preemption case. 44 In ascertaining whether federal law
should control in a state-related issue, a court will analyze the overrationale underlying a decision in one field to the problem in another context")
(citation omitted).
39. See Hillsborough County, Florida v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S.
707, 713 (1985) (noting that "when acting within constitutional limits, Congress is
empowered to pre-empt state law by so stating in express terms") (citation omitted); Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963) (holding
that federal regulation should not be determined preemptive of state law "in the
absence of persuasive reasons - either that the nature of the regulated subject
matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so
ordained").
40. See Hawkins, 184 F.3d at 248 (stating that ascertaining these presumptions
is necessary in determining exactly what Congress intended to preempt).
41. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (explaining
presumption that historic police powers of state were not to be superseded unless
by clear purpose of Congress); see also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 54 (1905)
(noting that Supreme Court has often supported exercise of police powers even in
border cases, construed validity of state statutes liberally and upheld state law).
42. County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1387, 1398
(E.D.N.Y. 1989) (citation omitted); see also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44
(1971) (stating, "Our Federalism... is a system in which there is sensitivity to the
legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the
National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal
rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly
interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.").
43. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (stating that reason
for his dissent was because of majority's decision "to embody their opinions in law
.... [and] [e]very opinion tends to become a law.").
44. See Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhom, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)
(noting that "[t] he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone" in preemption
case); see also Hawkins, 184 F.3d at 248 (stating that congressional purpose may be
gleaned from language of Act, statutory framework, and structure and purpose of
Act as a whole); Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 (noting that preemption is not valid "unless
[it is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress").
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all text and structure of the statute before

it. 4 5

The Seventh Circuit

held that, "Preemption does not depend on a single federal regulation itself covering the subject matter of the state law."'46 Furthermore, a court must examine the total congressional scheme and
legislative history of a particular statute when proceeding with a

47
preemption analysis.

2.

Implied Preemption

Because discovering the intent of Congress often is not easy to
discern, implied preemption is more difficult to establish than express preemption. 48 A showing of implied preemption must be
"clear and manifest. ' 49 Implied preemption occurs when the federal regulatory scheme is so comprehensive that Congress "left no
room" for supplementary state regulation. 50 In order to assess
whether the federal government has "left no room" to the states, a
45. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Doyle, 186 F.3d 790, 794 (7th Cir.
1999) (stating that "[e]vidence of preemptive purpose is sought in the text and
structure of the statute at issue[, and] [i]f the statute contains an express preemption clause, the task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus on the
plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress' preemptive intent") (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658,
663-64 (1993)); see also Gaming Corp. of Am. v. Dorsey & Whitney, 88 F.3d 536,
543 (1996) (stating that courts are reluctant to find federal statutes completely
preemptive of state law).
46. Burlington, 186 F.3d at 795 (noting that for preemption to be valid, federal
regulations must "substantially subsume" and not merely "touch upon" or "relate
to" subject matter of state law) (citation omitted).
47. See Fed. of Adver. Indus. Representatives, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 189 F.3d
633, 637 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that understanding congressional scheme and
legislative history is essential in understanding Congressional intent of
preemption).
48. For a discussion of the difficulty in interpreting congressional intent with
regard to preemption, see supra notes 35-38, 44-47 and accompanying text.
49. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992). The Cipollone
court held:
The principles of federalism and respect for state sovereignty that
underlie the Court's reluctance to find pre-emption [sic] where Congress
has not spoken directly to the issue apply with equal force where Congress has spoken, though ambiguously. In such cases, the question is not
whether Congress intended to pre-empt [sic] state regulation, but to what
extent. We do not, absent unambiguous evidence, infer a scope of preemption [sic] beyond that which clearly is mandated by Congress'
language.
Id. at 533 (emphasis omitted).
50. See Hillsborough County, Florida v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S.
707, 713 (holding that congressional intent to preempt state laws in particular area
may be inferred, despite absence of express preemptive language) (citation
omitted).
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51
court must ascertain the intent underlying the federal scheme.
When construing legislative history in order to determine the intent of Congress, the plain language of a statute controls, "unless
there is reason to believe Congress intended that language to have
some more restrictive meaning." 5 2 In addition, the federal interest
in a particular area of law may be so dominant that federal law will
implicitly preclude the enforcement of state laws on the same

subject.

53

Implied preemption also occurs when a state law "stands as an
obstacle" to the objectives of the federal law.5 4 The "obstacle-type"

implied preemption does not require actual conflict between state
and federal law.5 5 Instead, this type of implied preemption rests on
56
the importance of uniformity among federal laws.

3.

Conflict Preemption

Conflict preemption is found when state and federal law con57
flict to the point at which following both would be impossible.
Conflict preemption may also be found where the state law impedes
51. See id. at 714 (stating that two indicia of intent to preempt are pervasiveness of federal regulations and dominance of federal interest in that particular
area of law) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
52. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521-22 (noting that although some legislative history
may suggest one congressional purpose, plain language of act or law will control)
(quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983)).
53. See Ray v. Ad. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978) (stating that dominance of federal interest in particular field is evidence of congressional intent to
preempt).
54. See Paul Wolfson, Preemption and Federalism: The Missing Link, 16 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 69, 75 (1988) (arguing that "this type of preemption now poses a
significant threat to the states' regulatory authority"). Wolfson stated that if a state
law stands as an obstacle to the full intended effect of a federal law, the federal law
may preempt even if Congress has not fully occupied the field of that particular
legislation. See id. at 77-78.
55. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 19, 67 (1941) (noting that absence of
conflict was not dispositive of preemption, but essential question was whether state
law "stands as an obstacle" to accomplishment and execution of congressional purposes and objectives).
56. See Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 169 (1963) (White,
J., dissenting) (noting that even without total occupation of field, Congress had
preempted state law because its purpose in enacting federal standards was to establish uniform standards of avocado quality throughout nation, and uniformity in
commerce represented strong federal interest).
57. See id. at 142-43 (stating that conflict preemption arises "where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility"); see also
Hoke, supra note 9, at 852 (suggesting meaning of phrase "to the contrary" in
preemption cases as "opposite," "seeking opposite objectives," or "likely to result in
opposite effects").
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the administration and execution of congressional objectives. 58 If
state and federal laws conflict, the federal law will preempt the state
9
law.5
B. Johnson Act
In 1950, Congress enacted the Johnson Act. 60 The primary
purpose of this statute was "to support the policy of those States
which outlaw slot machines and similar gambling devices, by
prohibiting use of the channels of interstate or foreign commerce
61
for the shipment of such machines or devices into such States."
The Johnson Act initially forbade gambling in the United States'
land and sea possessions. 6 2 In 1992, a congressional amendment to
the Johnson Act completely altered the purpose and effect of the
63
statute.
The amended Act effectively permitted riverboat gambling in
the United States. 64 In addition, the Johnson Act required a state
58. See Ray v. Ad. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978) (noting that "[elven
if Congress has not completely foreclosed state legislation in a particular area,"
conflict with federal law will nonetheless preempt state law).
59. See Wolfson, supra note 54, at 88 (asserting that this is true if laws actually
conflict, but there "need be no actual conflict for the state law to be preempted;
there need only be an 'interference' or an 'obstacle'").
60. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1175.
61. H.R. REP. No. 81-2769, at 2 (1950). See also H.R. REP. No. 87-1828, at 6
(1962) (stating intent of Johnson Act was "to assist the States to enforce their laws
and to combat organized crime"); Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of
P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986) (describing reasons local governments are reluctant
to legalize gambling include likelihood of "disruption of moral and cultural patterns, the increase in local crime, the fostering of prostitution, the development of
corruption, and the infiltration of organized crime").
62. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1175. The Johnson Act's general rule stated, "[i]t shall
be unlawful to manufacture, recondition, repair, sell, transport, possess, or use any
gambling device in the District of Columbia, in any possession of the United States,
within Indian country... or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction
of the United States ... including on a vessel .

. . ."

Id. § 1175 (a).

63. See id. § 1175(b)(1). The amendment reads as follows:
In general: [e]xcept as provided in paragraph (2), this section does
not prohibit (A) the repair, transport, possession or use of a gambling
device on a vessel that is not within the boundaries of any State or possession of the United States; (B) the transport or possession, on a voyage, of
a gambling device on a vessel that is within the boundaries of any State or
possession of the United States, if - (i) use of the gambling device on a
portion of that voyage is, by reason of subparagraph (A), not a violation
of this section; and (ii) the gambling device remains on board that vessel
while the vessel is within the boundaries of that State or possession ....
Id.
64. See id. Riverboat gambling, according to the Johnson Act, is a "voyage or
segment [of a voyage] respectively... (i) that begins and ends in the same State or
possession of the United States, and (ii) during which the vessel does not make an
intervening stop within the boundaries of another State or possession of the
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that desired exemption from the general provisions of the statute to
enact a statute that explicitly prohibited the use of gambling on
such a vessel. 65 In its legislative history, Congress provided that,
"Gambling on so-called 'voyages-to-nowhere' and voyages between
two points in a State would be prohibited if the State from which
they are operating has a law prohibiting gambling activities on
these voyages." 66 Furthermore, Congress' express intent in amending the Johnson Act was to enable domestic vessels to compete with
67
foreign vessels that allowed shipboard gambling.
While few jurisdictions have addressed expressly the Johnson
Act's impact on state gambling laws, those that have, argue that the
amended Johnson Act has little effect on state power to regulate
gambling within state borders. 68 Still, in response to the Johnson
United States or a foreign country." Id. § 1175(b) (2) (B). See generally Bennett,
supra note 6, at 19 (analyzing difficulties that arise from emergence of riverboat
gambling in United States).
65. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1175(b) (2) (A). This section of the Johnson Act
provides:
Paragraph (1)(A) [prohibiting gambling in the United States] does not
apply to the repair or use of a gambling device on a vessel that is on a
voyage or segment of a voyage.. ifthe State or possession of the United States
in which the voyage or segment begins and ends has enacted a statute the terms of
which prohibit that repairor use on that voyage or segment."

Id. (emphasis added).
66. H.R. REp. No. 102-357, at 5 (1991). The report cites the State of Hawaii as
an example as a state that "enacted a law prohibiting gambling activities on a vessel
that embarks from any point within the State, and disembarks at the same or another point within the State, except, on travel from the Continental United States
or a foreign country." Id.
67. See id. at 5 (stating, "[t ] he clear intent and purpose of this amendment to
the Johnson Act is to allow those activities [gambling on vessels where the voyage
begins and ends in the same place] on U.S.-flag vessels to the same extent that they
are currently allowed on foreign-flag vessels."); see also The Cruises to Nowhere Act of
1991: Hearings on H.R 316 le/ore the House Transp. and InfrastructureSubcomm. on
Coast Guard and Maritime Transp., 106th Cong. (1999) [hereinafter Hearings on
H.R 316] (statement of Frank R. Wolf, Rep.) (notingJohnson Act amendment was
enacted to "even the playing field between foreign and U.S. flagship vessels" with
respect to ship-board gambling); Leigh Strope, Court Says S.C. Can Prohibit Gambling Cruises, AssOCIATEn PREss NEWSWiRES, July 7, 1999 (stating that amendments
lifted restrictions on transportation and possession of gambling devices outside
state's territorial waters).
68. See Leisure Time Cruise Corp. v. Town of Barnstable, 62 F. Supp. 2d 202,
208 (D. Mass. 1999) (holding that Johnson Act did not explicitly preempt regulation of land, wetland, and pier uses ancillary to Leisure Time's operation of its
gambling cruise); Butterworth v. Chances Casino Cruises, Inc., No. 97-846-CIV-J20, 1997 WL 1068628, at *4 (M.D. Fla. July 14, 1997) (holding that Johnson Act
was created to assist state and local authorities in enforcing anti-gambling statues,
not to preempt state law); Padavan v. City of New York, 685 N.Y.S.2d 35, 35-36
(1999) (holding that "nothing in the amendments to the Johnson Act support[s]
plaintiff's contention that they were intended by Congress to preempt local regulation of so-called gambling 'cruises to nowhere.' ... [The amendments] cannot be
understood to deprive States or municipalities of the prerogative, in the exercise of
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Act amendments, Hawaii, 69 New York 70 and California 71 have en-

acted legislation specifically outlawing or regulating riverboat
gambling.
C.

South Carolina Gambling Laws

Traditionally, South Carolina laws have restricted gambling
within its borders. 72 This tradition is evidenced in the following
examples. 73 First, South Carolina has a ban on lotteries.7 4 The
their police powers to reasonably regulate the conduct of shipboard gambling
businesses operating from within their jurisdictional bounds.").
69. See, e.g., HAw. REv. STAT. § 712-1222.5 (1992). This statute criminalizes
promotion of shipboard gambling and defines "gambling ship" as "any craft kept,
operated, or maintained for the purpose of gambling, whether within or without
the waters of the State and whether it is anchored, moored, lying to, or navigating." Id. It provides:
(1) A person commits the offense of promoting gambling aboard
ships if the person knowingly advances or profits from gambling activity
by: (a) Managing, supervising, controlling, operating, or owning, either
alone or in association with others, a gambling ship; (b) Managing, supervising, controlling, operating, or owning, either alone or in association
with others, any craft which embarks from any point within the State, and
disembarks at the same or another point within the State, during which
the person intentionally causes or knowingly permits gambling activity to
be conducted, whether within or without the waters of the State; or (c)
Transporting, conveying, or carrying any person to a gambling ship or a
craft described in paragraph (b).
Id.
70. See N.Y.C. LocAL LAw 57 (1997). This New York City statute reads, "City
regulation of gambling 'cruises to nowhere' that operate from locations within
New York City is necessary to ensure public confidence and trust in such activities
and to safeguard the security of the public who participate in them." Id. Under
the same law, the New York City Council is responsible for licensing the cruises
and for establishing a gambling control commission. Id.; N.Y.C. CODE § 20-952 (establishing powers and duties of New York City commission that regulates shipboard gambling).
71. See Scott Ritter, U.S. Appeals Court Upholds S.C. Gambling Regulations, Dow
JONES NEWS SERV., July 7, 1999 (noting that, in response to Johnson Act amendments, California passed law barring gambling boats from docking).
72. See Casino Ventures v. Stewart, 183 F.3d 307, 309 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating
that "[s] tate statutes have long prohibited the possession and use of certain gambling devices within South Carolina territory"). But see Casino Ventures v. Stewart,
23 F. Supp. 2d 647, 649 (D.S.C. 1998) (stating South Carolina has not opted out of
Johnson Act or enacted law referencing Johnson Act); Zane Wilson, Casino Owner
Emerges as Top Spender on Lobbyists in South Carolina,KNIGHT-RIDDER TrUB. Bus. NEWS
(Myrtle Beach, S.C.), Nov. 3, 1999 (stating that federal judge allowed Casino Ventures to continue business because South Carolina had not expressly barred
riverboat gambling).
73. For a discussion of South Carolina's ban on lotteries and certain other
"unlawful games and betting," see infra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
74. See Casino Ventures, 183 F.3d at 309 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-19-10 to 30 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1999)).
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state prohibits setting up lotteries, adventuring in lotteries, and sell7
ing lottery tickets.

5

76
Second, the State bans certain "unlawful games and betting.
South Carolina enumerates the activities that constitute unlawful
games and betting and specifies where those activities cannot be
carried out. 7 7 Riverboat gambling, however, is not included on that

list. 78 In fact, the statute does address explicitly riverboats in an75.

See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-19-10 (setting up lotteries):
[W] hoever shall publicly or privately erect, set up, or expose to be played
or drawn at or shall cause or procure to be erected, set up, or exposed to
be played, drawn, or thrown at any lottery under the denomination of
sales of houses, lands, plate, jewels, goods, wares, merchandise, or other
things whatsoever or for money or by any undertaking whatsoever, in the
nature of a lottery, by way of chances, either by dice, lots, cards, balls,
numbers, figures, or tickets or who shall make, write, print or publish, or
cause to be made, written, or published any scheme or proposal for any
of the purposes aforesaid is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, must be fined one thousand dollars and imprisoned for one year

§ 16-19-20 (adventuring in lotteries):
[W]hoever shall be an adventurer in or shall pay any moneys or other
consideration or shall in any way contribute unto or upon account of any
sales or lotteries shall forfeit for every such offense the sum of one hundred dollars to be recovered with costs of suit, by action or indictment in
any court of competent jurisdiction in this State ....
§ 16-19-30 (selling lottery tickets):
[I] t shall be unlawful to offer for sale any lottery tickets or to open or
keep any office for the sale of lottery tickets, and if any person shall offend against any of the provisions of this section he shall, on conviction
thereof, forfeit and pay to the State a sum not exceeding ten thousand
dollars.
76. See Casino Ventures, 183 F.3d at 309 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-19-40 and
16-19-130). For the language of S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-19-40 (unlawful games and
betting), see infra note 78 and accompanying text. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-19-130
(betting, pool selling, bookmaking and the like are prohibited):
[A]ny person within this state who: (1) [E]ngages in betting at any race
track, pool selling or bookmaking, with or without writing, at any time or
place; (2) [K]eeps or occupies any room, shed, tenement, booth, building, float or vessel, or any part thereof, or occupies any place or stand of
any kind upon any public or private grounds within this State with books,
papers, apparatus or paraphernalia for the purpose of recording or registering bets or wagers or of selling pools ... [s]
hall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding
one thousand dollars or imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both
fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
77. For the text of the South Carolina statute, see infra note 78; see also Casino
Boats Float Above Gambling Laws, Judge Says, HERALD (Rock Hill, S.C.) Oct. 9, 1999,
at 2B [hereinafter Casino Boats Float] (noting that "the existing South Carolina
statutes do not address the storage of gaming equipment, on board a vessel, in
South Carolina waters, nor do they address day cruises").
78. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-19-40. The statute, in pertinent part, reads as
follows:
If any person shall play at any tavern, inn, store for the retailing of spirituous liquors or in any house used as a place of gaming, barn, kitchen,
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other section, but that reference deals solely with registering or
79
waging bets, not casino gambling, on vessels.
IV.

NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

In an unanimous opinion, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's finding of preemption in Casino Ventures.8 0 In arriving
at its decision, the circuit court relied on two basic areas of law: the
federal Supremacy Clause doctrine in relation to state police powers and federal preemption of state laws. 8 1
A.

Supremacy Clause and State Police Power

First, the Fourth Circuit conceded the fact that under the
82
United States Constitution, federal law may override state law.
However, the court noted that any Supremacy Clause analysis begins with the assumption that Congress did not intend to displace
state law. 8 3 The court held that, "This presumption is at its zenith
when federal law impinges upon core state police powers. States
have long possessed primary responsibility... to protect the health,
welfare, safety, and morals of their citizens. '8 4 The court also stated
that when a state law concerning its police power is challenged
under the Supremacy Clause, the Supreme Court has presumed
stable or other outhouse, street, highway, open wood, race field or open
place at ... [any type of gambling] . . .upon being convicted thereof,

before any magistrate, shall be imprisoned ... or fined ....
Id. Cf FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 849-36, 849-231 (West 2000) (specifically referencing
gambling aboard vessel and outlawing such activity).
79. See S.C. CODE. ANN. § 16-19-130. This statute references "betting, pool
selling, bookmaking and the like" and states if any person
keeps a... float or vessel... for the purpose of registering bets or wagers
or of selling pools or owns or leases any . . . float or vessel . . .for the

purpose of recording or registering such bets or wagers or the selling of
such pools or becomes the custodian or depository for gain, hire or reward of any money, property or thing of value staked, wagered or pledged
...[that person] shall be guilty of a misdemeanor ....
Id.
80. See Casino Ventures v. Stewart, 183 F.3d 307, 308 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating
that "South Carolina authorities remain free to enforce state criminal prohibitions
against illicit gambling cruise activity").
81. See id. at 310-13. The appellate court opinion is divided into two distinct
sections. See id. The first section, (A), addresses federal preemption of South Carolina's restrictions on gambling (a traditionally held police power). See id. at 31012. The second section, (B), addresses the issue of conflict preemption of the state
law. See id. at 312-13.
82. See id. at 310 (acknowledging that United States Constitution authorizes
federal preemption).
83. See id. (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).
84. Id.
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that a federal act would not supersede these police powers unless
doing so was the clear purpose of Congress.8 5 As a result, the
Fourth Circuit indicated that because South Carolina state gambling restrictions attempted to promote the welfare, safety and
morals of South Carolinians, those restrictions represented a wellrecognized exercise of South Carolina's police power.8 6 The court
concluded that because the regulation of gambling was a state police power, a court should view any inference of federal preemption
87
cautiously and reluctantly.
B.

Federal Preemption of State Laws

The Fourth Circuit did not find an implied preemption of state
First, the court noted that "the ultimate touchstone" in a preemption case is the congressional purpose behind it.89 The court
then outlined three situations in which federal law implicitly
preempts state law.90 First, federal law preempts state law when the
federal law thoroughly occupies a legislative field and leaves no
room for the states to supplement it.91 Second, federal law
92
preempts state law if the state law conflicts with federal law.
Third, preemption of state law occurs when the state law acts as an
93
obstacle to the fulfillment of congressional objectives.
law.8 8

85. See Casino Ventures, 183 F.3d. at 310 ("[T]his 'approach is consistent with
both federalism concerns and the historic primacy of state regulation of matters of
health and safety.'") (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
86. See id. (stating that "respect for state prerogatives dictates a cautious preemption analysis - one which is reluctant to imply a broad ouster of state authority") (quoting Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328,
341 (1986)).
87. See id. (noting that both parties admitted Congress did not expressly preempt South Carolina's state gambling laws). Because the preemption was not express, the issue becomes one of implied preemption, and Casino Ventures claimed
the Johnson Act amendments created an implied preemption by federal law. See
id.
88. See id. (finding, "Casino Ventures asserts that the 1992 amendments to the
Johnson Act worked an implicit preemption of state laws, such as South Carolina's,
that prohibit gambling voyages to nowhere. We disagree.").
89. See id. (quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)).
90. For a discussion of these situations, see infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
91. See Casino Ventures, 183 F.3d at 310 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)).
92. See id. (noting that courts find preemption when it is impossible to comply
with federal and state laws at same time).
93. See id.
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The Fourth Circuit found no basis for preemption on any of
the three bases for implied preemption claims. 9 4 It held that
neither maritime matters nor gambling laws are subject to federal
law exclusively. 95 On the contrary, it stated, "federal law in these
fields respects both our system of dual sovereignty and the impor96
tant regulatory interests of the states."
The court held that both state and federal governments share
in the development and regulation of maritime law. 97 The court
then extended that notion of shared powers to the regulation of
gambling. 98 The Fourth Circuit asserted that if federal law thoroughly occupied the field of riverboat gambling, leaving no room
for the state to supplant it, the claim of implicit preemption would
be a valid one. 99 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that maritime and
gambling matters are not exclusively federal fields of control. 100
The Johnson Act, the court held, was initially enacted to support
the policy of the states that outlawed gambling. 10 1 Furthermore,
the court noted that Congress did not apply the Johnson Act's provisions to state territorial waters.1 0 2 In addition, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that the Johnson Act enhanced state police powers
94. See id. ("There is no basis for finding federal field preemption of South
Carolina's restrictions on gambling.").
95. See id. at 310-11 (noting that basing preemption claim on federal dominance of maritime law would be futile, because maritime is both federal and state
regulated area of law).
96. Casino Ventures, 183 F.3d at 310.
97. See id. at 310-11 (noting that "[m]aritime law is not a monistic system,"
and throughout history of maritime law in United States, its control and development has been jointly shared) (quoting Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co.,
358 U.S. 354, 374 (1959)).
98. See id. at 311 (noting, without citing any authority, "Congress has explicitly
recognized the preeminent state interests in controlling gambling and has sought
to extend, not curb, state police power in this field."). For example, the Fourth
Circuit stated that Congress "delegat[ed] to the states significant authority to
shape applicable federal law" and concluded that, "Congress has acted in aid, not
in derogation, of state regulatory authority." Id.
99. See id. at 310 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516
(1992)).
100. See id. (noting that federal government respects system of "dual sovereignty" and "important regulatory interests of the states").
101. See Casino Ventures, 183 F.3d at 311 (stating thatJohnson Act outlaws slot
machines and similar gambling devices, by prohibiting use of interstate or foreign
commerce channels for shipment of such machines or devices into states that outlaw such activities).
102. See id. The court stated, "By its terms, section 1175 applies only to vessels
'within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States as defined in section 7 of Title 18.' The special maritime jurisdiction . . . excludes
waters subject to the control of state authorities." Id. (citations omitted).
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through the provision allowing states to construe a "cruise to no10 3
where" as a federal crime.
In addressing the first form of implied preemption,1 0 4 the
court found no preemption and upheld the state law. 10 5 The court
held that the regulation of gambling was not a legislative field that
06
Congress intended to occupy exclusively.'
The court also found no preemption under the second 0 7 and
third types10 8 of implied preemption.1 0 9 The court reasoned that
the federal statute gave great latitude to the states in enforcing the
terms of the Johnson Act. 10° The court also noted that the Act
criminalizes riverboat gambling cruises if a state enacts a statute
banning them. 1 Therefore, the court concluded that Congress
enacted theJohnson Act to support and cooperate with state law.' 1 2
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit asserted that because Congress
explicitly addressed the issue of preemption in the Johnson Act, a
court should not find any implicit preemption.1 1 3 The court viewed
103. See id. (noting that "[c]ruises to nowhere remain a federal crime if a state
'has enacted a statute the terms of which prohibit' the use of gambling devices on
such cruises") (citations omitted).
104. For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit's finding, see infra notes 105-06.
The court described this type of implied preemption as when federal law thoroughly occupies a legislative field. Id.
105. See Casino Ventures, 183 F.3d at 311-12 (noting that federal law recognizes
vital state interests in controlling gambling).
106. See id. at 312 (stating that because Johnson Act grants state authority to
adjust contours of federal law, it augments, rather than diminishes state power in
regulating gambling).
107. See id. at 310 (stating that this occurs when state and federal laws conflict
so much that complying with both is impossible).
108. See id. (stating that this occurs when state and federal laws conflict so
much that complying with both stands as obstacle to accomplishment of congressional purpose).
109. See id. (noting that "the plain language, structure and purpose of section
1175 is completely at odds with preemption ....[and the enactment] leaves regulation of [state territorial] waters to the state") (citations omitted).
110. See Casino Ventures, 183 F.3d at 312 (stating that "allowing states to make
their own regulatory choices about gambling does not interfere with the purpose
of the 1992 amendments [to the Johnson Act]").
111. See id. (construing 15 U.S.C.A. § 1175 (b)(2)(A)).
112. See id. (noting that "[bly permitting states to adjust the contours of federal law, section 1175 augments state authority... [and] the entire theme of this
statute is one of cooperative federalism and respect for dominant state interests.
Nothing leads to the conclusion that federal law has supplanted South Carolina's
regulatory authority over gambling.").
113. See id. (noting Johnson Act's specific provision regarding Alaska). The
Johnson Act contains an express provision preempting the gambling laws of Alaska
on certain voyages. It states that,
With respect to a vessel operating in Alaska, this section does not prohibit, nor may the State of Alaska make it a violation of law for there to
occur, the repair, transport, possession, or use of any gambling device on
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this inclusion of an explicit preemption as "strong evidence that
Congress did not wish to extend preemption any further."1 14 The
court inferred Congress' inclusion of a provision expressly preempting state law as a reliable indication that Congress' preemptive
1 15
intent was limited to that specific section alone.
Finally, the court held that the Johnson Act's express exception would be unnecessary if Casino Ventures had construed the
statute correctly. 116 The court stated that if Congress had implicitly
preempted state gambling laws, the inclusion of the express preemption of Alaskan laws would be unwarranted.'1 17 It held, "[s] tates
were already preempted from interfering with those activities ....
[Therefore,] the Alaska exception only makes sense if states are not
generally preempted from barring the possession and transporta1 18
tion of gambling devices within their territorial waters."
In conclusion, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the Johnson Act did not prohibit South Carolina from banning
gambling. 119
V.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

Before assessing the likely impact and precedential value of Casino Ventures, it is necessary to examine the two issues upon which
the Fourth Circuit based its holding: the intent of the Johnson
Act'

20

and preemption.

12 1

board a vessel which provides sleeping accommodations for all of its passengers ....

Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C.A. § 1175(c) (1)).
114. Id. at 312.
115. See CasinoVentures, 183 F.3d at 312 (holding, "[w]hen Congress has considered the issue of preemption and has included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that issue, and when that provision provides a reliable
indicium of congressional intent with respect to state authority, there is no need to
infer congressional intent to preempt state laws.") (citation omitted).
116. See id. (noting that Casino Ventures read Johnson Act as both legalizing
and preempting states from criminalizing gambling on vessels).
117. For a more specific statement of the court's holding, see infra note 118
and accompanying text.
118. See Casino Ventures, 183 F.3d at 312 (stating that express exception would
not be needed if implicit preemption existed). For the language of the statute, see
supra note 113.
119. See Casino Ventures, 183 F.3d at 313 (noting that "a number of coastal
states do not want gambling on vessels in their waters and this legislation retains
the right of States to continue to prohibit gambling") (citation omitted).
120. For a discussion of the Johnson Act's intent, see infra notes 122-50 and
accompanying text.
121. For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit's preemption analysis, see infra
notes 151-85 and accompanying text.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol7/iss2/8

18

2000]

Peterson: High Stakes
and Low Tides: The Fourth Circuit Gambles by Forbiddi
HIGH STAKES AND Low TIDES
A.

Intent of the Johnson Act

The original intent of the Johnson Act was to support the policy of the states that outlawed gambling. 122 The Fourth Circuit focused on the original, underlying legislative history of the Johnson
Act in Casino Ventures. 123 Therefore, instead of analyzing the case
under the currentJohnson Act, the court focused only on the original intent of the Johnson Act, namely, to prohibit gambling within
124
the United States.
In 1992, when Congress amended the Johnson Act, it also
changed the intent behind the Act. 125 The legislative history behind the original Johnson Act stated that the intent of the Act was
to support those states that outlawed gambling. 126 In contrast, the
legislative history behind the 1992 amendment to the Johnson Act
indicated that the intent of the amendment was to legalize
27
riverboat-type gambling on United States vessels.'
Congress conceded that riverboat gambling would be outlawed
if a state prohibited such gambling activities and outlined an example of a state doing exactly that. 28 The congressional report stated
in explicit terms that, "The amendment will allow gambling on voyages-to-nowhere unless the State from which the vessel is operating
has a law specifically prohibiting those types of voyages; Hawaii has
122. See H.R. REP. No. 81-2769, at 2 (1950) (stating that intent ofJohnson Act
was to support states in enforcing gambling laws).
123. See Casino Ventures, 183 F.3d at 309, 311 (stating that Johnson Act's
amendment was aimed at equalizing riverboat gambling competition with foreign
ships, but emphasizing that purpose of original Act was to support states that outlawed gambling); see also H.R. REP. No. 81-2769, at 2-3 (referencing intent ofJohnson Act as assisting state and local governments in enforcing their laws and
specifically not substituting federal law enforcement for state and local law enforcement in this field).
124. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1175(a) (stating generally that gambling in the United
States is illegal); H.R. REP. No. 81-2769, at 2 (stating purpose ofJohnson Act was to
support states' policies which outlaw gambling).
125. For a discussion of the changed intent of the Johnson Act because of its
1992 amendments, see infra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
126. See H.R. REP. No. 81-2769, at 2 (stating that purpose is to support by
"prohibiting use of the channels of interstate or foreign commerce for the shipment of such machines or devices into such States"); see also H.R. REP. No. 87-1828
(noting, "[T]he purpose of the act was to lessen the revenue accruing to crime
syndicates.").
127. See H.R. REP. No. 102-357, at 2-4 (also stating that gambling is prohibited
on vessels unless it occurs on vessel in state that has legalized such gambling
aboard ships); see also Hearings on H.
316, supra note 67 (statement of Frank R.
Wolf, Rep.) (stating that "the 1992 amendment was offered ... to allow U.S. passenger vessels to offer gambling and even the playing field between foreign and
U.S. flagship vessels").
128. See H.R. REP. No. 102-357, at 2-4 (requiring that state from which cruises
operate have law prohibiting gambling activities on such voyages).
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such a statute." 29 Hawaii expressly banned gambling aboard ships,
130
while South Carolina did not.
Several district courts within the First, Second and Eleventh
Circuits have challenged the effect that the Johnson Act has on
state gambling regulations. 31 However, each of these cases is distinguishable from Casino Ventures.
First, in Leisure Time Cruise Corp. v. Town of Barnstable,132 the
facts differed from those in Casino Ventures.1 3 3 In Leisure Time, the
town of Barnstable did not prohibit the Leisure Time Cruise Corporation from carrying out its business; rather, the town merely required the corporation to obtain local permits and to perform
improvements to the waterfront and parking areas as a prerequisite
to beginning its operation.1 3 4 The Leisure Time court held, "Compliance with both the Johnson Act and local and regional regulation
would by no means be impossible in this case."'13 5 In contrast, it
would be impossible for a person to engage in riverboat gambling,
as permitted by the Johnson Act and to comply with the laws of
129. Id.
130. CompareHAw.REv. STAT. § 712-1222.5 (stating that promoting gambling
activity on ships either by supervising, owning or operating such a gambling vessel
is felony in Hawaii and defining "gambling ship" as "craft" and "craft" as: "boat,
ship, vessel, barge, hulk, or other thing capable of floating [that is] kept, operated,
or maintained for the purpose of gambling, whether within or without the waters
of the State and whether it is anchored, moored, lying to, or navigating"), with S.C.
CODE ANN.§ 16-19-40 (stating that person is subject to fine and/or imprisonment
if he or she gambles [definition omitted] at any "tavern, inn, store for the retailing
of spiritous liquors or in any house used as a place of gaming, barn, kitchen, stable,
or other outhouse, street, highway, open wood, race field or open place . . .").
Note the absence of the term "vessel" or "ship" or "floating device" in the South
Carolina Statute. See, e.g., Casino Boats Float, supra note 77, at 2B (stating that circuit judge held that no South Carolina gambling law specifically addressed gambling aboard boat or cruise to nowhere).
131. See Leisure Time Cruise Corp. v. Town of Barnstable, 62 F. Supp. 2d 202,
209 (D. Mass. 1999) (holding that Leisure Time failed to prove federal preemption
of local regulations); Butterworth v. Chances Casino Cruises, Inc., No. 97-846-CIVJ-20, 1997 WL 1068628, at *4 (M.D. Fla. July 14, 1997) (stating that Johnson Act
did not preempt Florida riverboat gambling law); Padavan v. City of New York, 685
N.Y.S.2d 35, 35 (1999) (finding no preemption by Johnson Act of New York City
law).
132. 62 F. Supp. 2d 202 (D. Mass. 1999).
133. For a discussion of this factual comparison, see infra notes 134-41 and
accompanying text.
134. See Leisure Time, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 205, 208 (stating thatJohnson Act did
not preempt zoning laws and those at heart of local governance).
135. Id. at 208 (stating, "[N]othing in the present record suggests that undergoing regulation by the Conservation Commission or the Cape Cod Commission
would impede Leisure Time's ability to comply with any federal statutory
requirements.").
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South Carolina.1 3 6 Furthermore, Leisure Time is distinguishable because the town wished only to regulate the gambling activity by assessing the potential impact on resources and capital facilities and
13 7
the amount of traffic the cruises' operation would produce.
Barnstable did not seek to prohibit Leisure Time from operating its
cruises.13 8 In fact, the court stated that the Commission may eventually issue the permits that would allow Leisure Time to operate its
cruises. 139 The Leisure Time court expressly stated that it would not
address the issue of whether a cruise to nowhere was illegal under
state or federal law, because this case centered around regulation of
elements "ancillary" to the operation of a gambling cruise. 140 Conversely, South Carolina sought to ban Casino Ventures from embarking on any gambling excursions at all and explicitly held that
the Johnson Act did not preempt South Carolina's gambling

laws. 141
A second case, Padavan v. City of New York, 1 42 held that the
Johnson Act did not preempt local regulation of "cruises to nowhere."1 43 This case is different from Casino Ventures because New
York City had a statute that regulated riverboat gambling within its
jurisdiction. 1 44 In contrast, South Carolina had no statute directly
145
addressing the legality or illegality of "cruises to nowhere.'
136. For a discussion of Casino Ventures'dubious preemption analysis, see infra
notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
137. See Leisure Time, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 205-06 (noting that Massachusetts General Court granted broad power to Cape Cod Commission to regulate developments of regional impact).
138. See id. at 205 (noting that Town of Bamstable Conservation Commission
ordered Leisure Time to remove its gambling boat from pier because its vessel did
not comply with Commission's conditions).
139. See id. at 206 (stating that Commission was waiting for Leisure Time's
cooperation in providing certain information to Commission about its operation).
140. See id. at 208 (noting that only regulation at issue here was of land, wetland and pier uses, not actual operation of gambling cruise).
141. See Casino Ventures v. Stewart, 23 F. Supp. 2d 647, 649 n.2 (D.S.C. 1998)
(listing statutes that prohibit gambling devices in South Carolina) (citations
omitted).
142. 685 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1999).
143. Id. at 35 (stating that 1992 Johnson Act amendments merely relaxed former congressional prohibition against gambling and did not preempt state
prohibitions of gambling).
144. See N.Y.C. CODE § 20-952 (providing that "[t] he commission shall be responsible for the licensing and regulation of shipboard gambling businesses"); see
also N.Y.C. CODE § 20-952 (establishing New York City commission that regulates
riverboat gambling).
145. For a discussion of the South Carolina statute and its failure to address
expressly "cruises to nowhere," see supra notes 77-78, 129-30 and accompanying
text.
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A third case, Butterworth v. Chances Casino Cruises, Inc., 146 held
that the Johnson Act did not preempt its state ban on riverboat
gambling. 14 7 The distinguishing feature between Butterworth and
Casino Ventures is that Florida already had adopted a statute specifically outlawing riverboat gambling, 148 whereas South Carolina did
not. 149 Because Florida had forbidden explicitly the gambling ac150
tivity, the Johnson Act, by its own concession, did not apply.
B.

Preemption in Other Circuits

Because the Fourth Circuit argued that any preemption by the
federal government would be based upon either implied or conflict
preemption, it is unnecessary to examine different circuits' views on
express preemption.
1. Implied Preemption
In Casino Ventures, the Fourth Circuit found no showing of implicit preemption of South Carolina's gambling restriction because
the federal government did not solely occupy the field of riverboat
gambling.' 5 ' The United States has the ability to regulate riverboat
gambling because vessels in navigation are subject to admiralty
law. 152 Yet, the regulation of gambling is generally viewed as the
146. No. 97-846-CIV-J-20, 1997 WL 1068628 (M.D. Fla. July 14, 1997).
147. See id. at *4 (contending that intent of Johnson Act was to assist, not
supplant, state laws prohibiting gambling).
148. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 849.36 (permitting law enforcement agents to
search vessel and seize any gambling devices on board); Id. § 849.231 (outlawing
domestic cruises to nowhere in Florida).
149. For a discussion of South Carolina's statute, see supranotes 77-78, 129-30
and accompanying text.
150. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1175(b)(2) (A). The statute provides that riverboat
gambling remains illegal "if the State or possession of the United States in which
the voyage or segment begins and ends has enacted a statute the terms of which
prohibit that repair or use on that voyage or segment." Id.
151. See Casino Ventures, 183 F.3d at 308, 310 (stating that "[n]either party
contends that Congress has expressly preempted the state laws at issue here....
Casino Ventures asserts that the 1992 amendments to the Johnson Act worked an
implicit preemption of state laws, such as South Carolina's, that prohibit gambling
voyages to nowhere."). The court disagreed with Casino Ventures' argument. Id.;
see also Ray v. Ad. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978) (stating evidence of
intent to preempt is federal dominance over particular area of law).
152. See Bennett, supra note 6, at 22-23 (stating, "[v]essels in navigation are
subject to maritime liability laws .... [and] vessels are subject to additional envi-

ronmental law regulation . . .governed by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, and the
Clean Water Act") (footnotes omitted). But see Wolfson, supra note 54, at 94-95
(noting that Supreme Court has stated there is "presumption that federal statutes
do not impinge on 'essential' and 'traditional' state interests such as health and
safety regulation . . .") (footnotes omitted).
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exercise of the state's police power, with the federal government
playing a minimal, if any, role in regulating it. 153 Because the federal government does not fully occupy the field of gambling regulation or maritime matters, regulating riverboat gambling cannot be
an example of implicit preemption where the federal government
"left no room" to the states. 1 54 As a result, the Fourth Circuit's finding of no implied preemption is sound.
The Fourth Circuit is not alone in its strict analysis of implied
preemption. The Seventh Circuit has been reluctant to find federal
implied preemption as well. 155 The Seventh Circuit exacted a strict
standard in finding preemption, holding that even if a federal law
expressly preempted state law, a court must, nonetheless, look to

153. See Casino Ventures, 183 F.3d at 311 (stating that state and federal governments play joint roles in development of gambling regulations and Congress has
often acted in aid of state regulatory authority over gambling); see also Posadas De
Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986) (holding that
"regulating gambling is a substantial governmental interest because it is in the
health, safety, and welfare of its citizens"); Leisure Time Cruise Corp. v. Town of
Barnstable, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 207 (D. Mass. 1999) (describing as "well-reasoned,"
Casino Ventures' statement that states are free to regulate gambling); Buttenworth,
1997 WL 1068628, at *4 (stating that Johnson Act merely intended to assist State
and local law enforcement officers in enforcing gambling laws); Padavan v. City of
New York, 685 N.Y.S.2d 35, 35-36 (1999) (stating that Johnson Act does not deprive municipalities ability to exercise police powers and regulate riverboat gambling in their jurisdiction); see also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)
(stating that federal government endeavors not to intrude on legitimate activities
of states); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (stating general assumption that unless clear and manifest congressional purpose says otherwise, states' police powers are not superceded by Federal Act); County of Suffolk v.
Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1387, 1398 (E.D.N.Y 1989) (stating that
federal courts strive to preserve state autonomy); Hills, supra note 34, at 831 (noting long constitutional tradition barring Congress from forcing state officials to
implement federal law).
154. See Hillsborough County, Florida v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S.
707, 713 (stating that congressional intent to preempt may be inferred, absent
express language) (citation omitted). For a further discussion of the requirements
of a showing of implied preemption, see supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
155. The Seventh Circuit is reluctant to find not only implied preemption but
also express preemption. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Doyle, 186 F.3d
790, 792-95 (7th Cir. 1999). This case dealt with preemption of Wisconsin laws
regarding railroads. See id. at 792. The federal government enacted the Federal
Rail Safety Act (49 U.S.C. § 20101 et seq.), which the railroads argued preempted
the Wisconsin "two person crew" statute. See id. at 794. The Court of Appeals
agreed, and it found express preemption on all but one issue. See id. at 792-93.
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the congressional intent of the express preemption. 15 6 The Eighth

15 7
Circuit has also been reluctant in finding preemption.
Casino Ventures was in accord with Fourth Circuit precedent on
the issue of implied preemption, which insists on inferring a perva15 8
sive federal scheme for a valid finding of implied preemption.
The Fourth Circuit held that discovering congressional intent is the
most important aspect of an implicit preemption claim. 159 In addition, the preemption claim becomes subject to stricter scrutiny
when the action that is to be "preempted" is one traditionally left to
the state. 1 60 The Casino Ventures case, thus, comports with Fourth
Circuit, other circuits' and national standards of implied

preemption.

2.

16 1

Conflict Preemption

The Fourth Circuit found no conflict preemption of South
Carolina's gambling restrictions. 16 2 In finding no such preemption, the court stated that the Johnson Act was completely at odds
156. See Burlington, 186 F.3d at 794 (stating that courts "interpreting a federal
statute pertaining to a subject traditionally governed by state law will be reluctant
to find preemption [and] preemption will not lie unless it is the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress") (citation omitted); see also Fed'n of Adver. Indus. Representatives, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 189 F.3d 633, 637 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that
.we must examine the congressional scheme and legislative history [of a law]").
157. See Gaming Corp. of Am. v. Dorsey & Whitney, 88 F.3d 536, 543 (8th Cir.
1996) (holding that for statute to be "completely preemptive," statute must have
"'extraordinary pre-emptive power,' a conclusion courts reach reluctantly.") (citation omitted).
158. See Worm v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 970 F.2d 1301, 1304 (4th Cir. 1992)
(noting that to discover implicit preemption, court must infer that Congress
wished to supplant state authority through regulating "so pervasively in the field as
not to leave sufficient vacancy within which any state can act") (citation omitted).
159. See id. at 1305 (stating, "[W]e presume that Congress did not intend to
nullify state law unless a contrary intent is 'clear and manifest.'") (citations
omitted).
160. See id. (discussing federal preemption in product liability law). The
court stated,
Particularly when it is urged that a deep-rooted body of [generally state
controlled] law has been preempted in a manner that effectively repeals
long-standing state law remedies, we should be fairly assured of the congressional intent, because we must assume that the balance between federal and state law will not be disturbed "unintentionally by Congress or
unnecessarily by the Courts."
Id. (citation omitted). This belief accords with Casino Ventures, because Casino Ventures held that regulating gambling was traditionally a state activity. See Casino Ventures, 183 F.3d at 310-11.
161. For a general discussion of implied preemption, see supra notes 48-56
and accompanying text.
162. See Casino Ventures, 183 F.3d at 312 (stating, "nor do we find that South
Carolina's laws conflict with the federal statute at issue here.").
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with preemption, was not in conflict with South Carolina's laws and
16
criminalized riverboat cruises if a state prohibited them.
Yet, the court's conclusion that the Johnson Act did not preempt South Carolina's ban on gambling by conflict is dubious for
several reasons. First, the basic idea behind conflict preemption is
that performing the permitted act under federal law without violating state law would be impossible.16 4 The Fourth Circuit concluded
that following the South Carolina statute, which banned gambling,
was not incompatible with contemporaneously following the Johnson Act, which permitted gambling off a state's maritime
1 65
boundary.
Second, the Fourth Circuit stated that the Johnson Act was
"completely at odds with preemption."'1 66 The legislative history behind the 1992 amendment to the Johnson Act does not suggest that
the Act focused on cooperation with the states; instead, it concentrated on equalizing the competition between domestic and foreign
163. See id. at 312-13 (discussing its interpretation of valid issues regarding
preemption in this case). In addition, the court noted,
[T]he plain language, structure, and purpose [of the Johnson Act] is
completely at odds with preemption. That federal enactment does not
even apply to South Carolina's territorial waters - it leaves regulation of
those waters to the state. This alone leads to the conclusion that state and
federal laws are not in conflict. But the statute goes even further. It
criminalizes gambling cruises to nowhere outside of a state's territorial
waters if a state enacts a law banning them ....
Id. at 312 (citations omitted).
164. See Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963) (stating this conflict nullifies state law to the extent that it actually conflicts
with federal law); see also Pac. Gas and Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation
& Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983) (stating that Congress may preempt
where complying with state and federal laws would be impossible); Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 210-11 (1824) (stating that state law will yield to
federal when they are incompatible); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316, 327 (1819) (holding that state laws will yield to federal laws when they conflict); Hawkins v. Leslie's Pool Mart, Inc., 184 F.3d 244, 247 (3d Cir. 1999) (same);
Hoke, supra note 9, at 872-75 (stating state laws contrary to federal law would be
preempted).
165. Compare 15 U.S.C.A. § 1175(b) (1) (B)-(2) (A) [1992 Amendment to Johnson Act] (stating that federal law "does not prohibit the transport or possession, on
a voyage, of a gambling device on a vessel that is within the boundaries of any State
or possession of the United States... unless the state or possession of the United
States in which the voyage or segment begins and ends has enacted a statute the
terms of which prohibit that repair or use on that voyage or segment"), with South
Carolina statutes outlawing gambling in the state of South Carolina, but not expressly addressing gambling on vessels. See S.C. CODE.ANN. §§ 16-19-10 to -40,-130;
see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (stating that essential question
of preemption rests on whether state law "stands as an obstacle" to Congressional
objectives and intent).
166. Casino Ventures, 183 F.3d at 312.
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gambling "voyages to nowhere.' 6 7 Furthermore, Congress had addressed the issue and completely contradicted the rationale of the
Fourth Circuit. 168 It acknowledged that the Johnson Act's amendment did, in fact, have a preemptive intent and effect. 169 As a result, the Fourth Circuit's pronouncement that the Johnson Act was
"at odds with preemption" is questionable.
The Fourth Circuit did not distinguish the original purpose of
the Johnson Act from the 1992 amended purpose of the Johnson
Act. 170 This distinction is a crucial one, because the amendment
altered the intent and effect of the Johnson Act by creating broad
171
exceptions to its prior ban on gambling.
Third, the Casino Ventures court stated that the Johnson Act
criminalized gambling cruises if a state enacted a law banning
them.1 72 The court, however, did not address the fact that South
Carolina had not yet enacted a specific law banning riverboat
cruises. 173 The Johnson Act expressly requires a state that wishes to
be exempted from the provision legalizing riverboat gambling to
enact a statute outlawing riverboat gambling.1 74 Thus, the Fourth
Circuit's dismissal of any possible conflict preemption claims seems
167. See H.R. REP. No. 102-357, at 3-4 (stating intent of Johnson Act is to
equalize competition of shipboard gambling between foreign and domestic
vessels).
168. For a discussion of Congress' contradiction of the Casino Ventures rationale, see infra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
169. See Hearingson H.R 316, supra note 67, at 4 (statement of Frank R. Wolf,
Rep.) (stating that "the 1992 law was crafted to create a 'quasi' state preemption").
170. For a discussion of the Johnson Act's purpose, see supra notes 101-03,
112, 122-27 and accompanying text.
171. See Hearings on H.R 316, supra note 67, at 4-5 (statement of Frank R.
Wolf, Rep.) (stating, "If a state did not have an explicit prohibition on cruises to
nowhere prior to 1992, the gambling cruises could operate in that state. After
1992, if the state decided to ban cruises to nowhere, it could.... The answer is for
the state legislatures to pass a law banning the gambling cruises.").
172. See Casino Ventures, 183 F.3d at 312 (noting that this is evidence of Congress' intent not to preempt state law).
173. For a discussion of the South Carolina gambling laws, see supra notes 7278, 129-30 and accompanying text; see also Casino Boats Float, supra note 77, at 2B
(stating that circuit court judge held "the existing South Carolina statutes do not
address the storage of gaming equipment, on board a vessel, in South Carolina nor
do they address day cruises"); Ritter, supra note 71 (noting that measure to ban
riverboat gambling was passed in South Carolina House in January 1998 but was
not acted upon by Senate); Strope, supra note 67, (stating that "South Carolina
legislators tried to pass an outright ban on the [gambling casino] boats .. .but
could not reach a compromise on the proposed legislation"); Wilson, supra note
72 (stating "legislators vowed to pass a law against [riverboat gambling] . . .[and
while] the state House passed a ban . . . the bill stalled in the Senate").

174. For a discussion of the amended intent of the Johnson Act, see supra
notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
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misplaced. 175 Congress has also acknowledged the preemptive effect of the Johnson Act in the absence of a state law explicitly forbidding riverboat gambling cruises to nowhere. 176 In sum,
Congress requires a state to "opt out" expressly of the Johnson Act,
or federal law will permit offshore gambling within that state.
Fourth, in finding no preemption of South Carolina law, the
Fourth Circuit negated the congressional intent of the Johnson Act
amendment; as a result, the court imposed its opinions on the law
and minimized the practical intent of the legislature. 177 Because
the intent, plain language and legislative history of the Johnson Act
recognize preemption of state law, the court in Casino Ventures
seemed to "substitut[e] the judgment of the court for that of the
legislature."1 7 8 In Casino Ventures, the circuit court found no preemption, despite the plain language of the Johnson Act stating that
a state was exempted from the provisions allowing gambling only if
it enacted a statute forbidding day cruise gambling. 179 In addition,
the legislative history behind the Johnson Act acknowledged the
Act's preemptive effect. 180 Any judicial activism in this case would
175. For a discussion of conflict preemption, see supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text. See also Casino Ventures, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 649 (stating, "Because
South Carolina has not enacted any legislation referencing the Johnson Act specifically or in substance, South Carolina has not 'enacted a statute the terms of which
prohibit' day cruises."). The judge also contended that "[t]he South Carolina
General Assembly could outlaw day cruises tomorrow and Plaintiff and any business like it would be lawfully put out of business. Until the South Carolina General
Assembly enacts such legislation, it is ordered that [Casino Ventures be able to
operate its day cruises]." Id. at 652.
176. See Hearings on H.R 316, supra note 67, at 4-5 (statement of Frank R.
Wolf, Rep.) (noting that effect ofJohnson Act has been federal preemption of state
laws forbidding gambling).
177. For a discussion of Congress' intent with regard to the Johnson Act and
the "quasi-preemptive" effect of the 1992 amendment, see supra notes 169-71 and
accompanying text. See also Casino Ventures, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 650 (stating, "South
Carolina lawmakers have yet to take similar measures to opt out of the 1992
amendments to the Johnson Act.").
178. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 32, § 11.3 (noting although Court
majority in Lochner [see supra note 41 and accompanying text] stated it would not
"substitut[e] the judgment of the court for that of the legislature," the "justices
believed they had an obligation to protect the free enterprise system .

. . .").

Al-

though the Fourth Circuit Court did not expressly state this, the Casino Ventures
decision and the Lochner decision are remarkably similar. Lochner, a case overturned later in the century, centered around a New York law that regulated the
number of hours a bakery employee could work. See Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45, 46 n.1 (1905). The Supreme Court found no legitimate purpose for the
legislation and stated, "[w]e do not believe in the soundness of the views which
uphold this law." Id. at 61.
179. For the text of the Johnson Act, see supra notes 65-66 and accompanying
text.
180. For a discussion of the Johnson Act's legislative history, see supra notes
65-66, 169-71 and accompanying text.
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be unnecessary and beyond the power of the court, because a judge
should invalidate a law only when "a rational and fair [person] necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions
of our people and our law."' 8 1 As a result, Casino Ventures parallels

the decision in Lochner v. New York, l8 2 because both cases represent
183
a high point of judicial activism.
After the district court's decision, the South Carolina legislature attempted to prohibit riverboat gambling, but it failed to do
so. 18 4 Instead of waiting for the legislature to reconvene and at-

tempt to pass a ban on riverboat gambling, the circuit court found
no preemption, even though existing South Carolina laws did not
address gambling aboard a vessel in South Carolina's territorial wa18 5
ters or riverboat cruises in general.
VI.

IMPACT

Because of its popularity and great revenue-raising potential,
riverboat gambling is likely to continue as a rapidly expanding form
of entertainment throughout the United States. 186 Yet, along with
181. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76 (Holmes,J., dissenting). Holmes' dissent in Lochner is perhaps one of the most famous dissents in any Supreme Court case. See
NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 32, § 11.3 (noting that Holmes believed "the Court
should not void a law simply because a legislature enacted the measure to implement [a] .

.

. policy the justices do not believe proper").

182. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
183. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 32, § 11.3 (stating that court's duty in
Lochner was to determine issue of constitutionality of regulating laborers' hours,
but court evaluated its decision based upon how it viewed impact of decision,
rather than using plain language of law as guide). The Casino Ventures court appeared to do the same.
184. For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit's ruling despite South Carolina's
law, see infra note 185 and accompanying text.
185. See Casino Boats Float, supra note 77 (stating that circuit court judge
found that existing South Carolina statutes did not reference riverboat gambling at
all, South Carolina statute predated Johnson Act and its amendments, and, as a
result, South Carolina could not rely upon those statutes in refusing to allow Casino Ventures to operate its riverboat casinos).
186. See Rick Alm, Open BoardingSeems to Aid Smaller Casinos, KAN. Cm STAR Mo., Dec. 2, 1999, at C1 (stating that in Kansas City, Missouri, when legislators
allowed riverboat gambling, casinos saw record admission and revenue); Dan Caesar, Slot Tourney Could Make Someone a Millionaire, ST. Louis DISPATCH, Sept. 19,
1999, at Fl1 (noting that in Missouri, riverboat gambling is sixth largest source of
revenue and has created over 12,000 jobs); Natasha Emmons, Slot Machines Main
Focus of World Gaming Congress and Expo, AMUSEMENT Bus., Nov. 29, 1999, at 14
(noting that National Thoroughbred Racing Association's Vice President argued
that "casino growth has exploded in the last several years"); Gambling: The Trouble
Is, It Makes Money, THE ECONOMIST, July 31, 1999 (stating that as soon as East Baton
Rouge, Louisiana, legalized riverboat casinos, revenues on those casino boats rose
48% in just ten days); Adam Steinhauer, Riverboats Thriving in Mississippi, LAS
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that burgeoning growth comes criticism. 18 7 Nonetheless, the holding of Casino Ventures probably will be questioned in the future.
First, because of the problems that have arisen in South Carolina

over gambling laws and the Johnson Act, Congress may be more apt
to express its preemptive intent clearly and explicitly.1 88 United
States Representatives already have begun to debate the confusing
effects of the Johnson Act on state gambling laws. 189 If Congress
had expressed its intent clearly in statutory language, the amount of
judicial speculation as to Congressional intent and 'judicial legislation" would have been decreased. 190 Although a Representative introduced an amendment that would eliminate the possibility of
federal preemption by the Johnson Act, 19 1 Congressional and State
Representatives continue to debate the true intent of the Johnson
Act.192
REv. -J., Sept. 27, 1999, at 4D (asserting that Illinois riverboat casinos' revenue grew by thirty-five percent in both July and August and that stock prices and
profits of riverboat casinos are surging).
187. See Hearings on HR 316, supra note 67, at 10 (statement of Bob Butterworth, Florida Att'y Gen.) (noting that riverboat casinos threaten to harm
coastal communities through environmental destruction, traffic congestion, disorderly behavior and obstruction of navigation); Prosecutor: Ex-Governor Was Filmed
Breaking Law, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 26, 2000, at A12 (discussing former Louisiana governor's involvement in extortionate licensing scheme for riverboat
gambling).
188. See Wolfson, supra note 54, at 112 (stating, "Congress [should] speak
clearly and explicitly whenever it preempts state legislation outside those areas that
the Constitution reserves for Congress alone"). The author asserted that preemption creates basic changes in the country's allocation of powers between the federal and state governments. See id.
189. See Hearingson H.R 316, supra note 67, at 5 (statement of Frank R. Wolf,
Rep.) (stating that reaction of local governments to both riverboat gambling in
general and to Johnson Act has been "one of bewilderment").
190. See Wolfson, supra note 54, at 113-14 (noting that "although courts
would still have to struggle with statutory language, they will be working with an
anchor holding them to Congress' preemptive intent .... [and requiring Congress' express statement of intent] offers the courts an opportunity to do something, but not too much, to protect federalism").
191. See H.R. 316, 106th Cong. § 3(2)(d) (1999) (proposing, "Nothing in this
section shall be construed to preempt the law of any State or possession of the
United States."). The amendment has not yet been passed, and its most recent
activity included Hearings before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation on July 28, 1999.
192. See Hearings on H.R 316, supra note 67, at 95 (statement of Robert Davis,
Rep.) (asserting that purpose ofJohnson Act was to allow gambling on U.S. cruises
and to allow states to retain option to outlaw them); id. at 2 (statement of Wayne T.
Gilchrest, Rep.) (stating that he questions legal and practical effects H.R. 316
would have on international and domestic cruise industry); id. at 88 (statement of
Linda Thomas Lowe, Gen. Counsel for City of Glocester) (arguing that current
federal law preempts local control over riverboat gambling cruises, despite existence of state law forbidding it); id. at 116 (statement of Tami E. Lewis,
Councilwoman for Town of Ponce Inlet, Florida) (asserting that passing H.R. 316
VEGAs

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2000

29

426

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 8
& ENT. LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 7: p. 397

VILLANOVA SPORTS

Second, South Carolina legislators continue to possess the option of passing an outright ban on riverboat gambling in their
state. 193 It is doubtful, however, that the South Carolina legislature
will be able to do so.194
Finally, South Carolina will likely permit the continued running of riverboat casinos, because a circuit court judge recently
found a showing of preemption regarding South Carolina gambling laws and permitted Casino Ventures to continue its operation
195
despite the Fourth Circuit's ruling.
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Casino Ventures is likely to have
little, if any, precedential value for two reasons. First, both sides
remain determined to continue fighting for their causes, 196 by citing authority that supports their particular contentions. 19 7 Second,
the legislature may eliminate the issue altogether by passing a law
would restore state power to outlaw cruises to nowhere without federal
preemption).
193. See Casino Ventures, 23 F. Supp. 2d 647, 652 (D.S.C. 1998) (stating that
South Carolina retains power to outlaw riverboat gambling cruises); Casino Boats
Float, supra note 77, at 2B (noting that on October 8, 1999, U.S. CircuitJudge A.
Victor Rawl granted declaration stating that state gambling laws do not apply to
riverboat gambling cruises, and "[liegislature 'is in no way pre-empted from outlawing cruises to nowhere and is free to do so at any time'").
194. See Ritter, supra note 71 (stating that in 1999 South Carolina failed to act
upon measure banning riverboat gambling); Strope, supra note 67 (noting that
South Carolina legislators tried to ban riverboat gambling cruises but could not
reach compromise); Wilson, supra note 72 (stating that owner of Victori Casino
[casino owned by Casino Ventures], "topped the list of spending on lobbyists in the
first three months of the year as lawmakers debated whether to ban the casino
boats").
195. See Casino Boats Float, supra note 77. In his declaration, CircuitJudge A.
Victor Rawl held that the state gambling laws did not apply to the riverboats operated by Casino Ventures. Id. In addition, Judge Rawl mentioned that, "existing
South Carolina statutes do not address the storage of gambling equipment, on
board a vessel, in South Carolina waters nor do they address day cruises." Id. Furthermore, Rawl held that the lotteries and bookmaking prohibitions did not apply
because neither of those activities takes place on boats. Id. Finally, the judge held
that although South Carolina has laws forbidding the possession of gambling
equipment, none of those laws specifically addresses possession of the equipment
aboard a boat on a cruise to nowhere. Id.
196. See Casino Boats Float, supra note 77 (noting that State Attorney General
Condon vowed to appeal circuit court declaration, which held South Carolina
gambling laws inapplicable to Casino Ventures' cruises); Strope, supra note 67
(stating that owner of Casino Ventures vowed to fight his way to Supreme Court).
197. See Justices Deal Blow to Offshore Gambling, MORNING STAR (Wilmington,
N.C.), Jan. 11, 2000, at 5B [hereinafter Justices Deal] (noting that after U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari to case, Dewayne Williams, operator of Casino Ventures stated, "At this moment, until further notification, I think we're able to
continue operating," while Charles Condon, South Carolina Attorney General
stated, "That ought to put an end to the matter [and casino boat operators] "ought
now to realize they have no legal leg to stand on."). For examples of such authorities, see supra notes 127-30, 168-73, 176-77, 185 and accompanying text.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol7/iss2/8

30

2000]

Peterson: High Stakes
andSTAKES
Low Tides:AND
The Fourth
HIGH
Low Circuit
TIDESGambles by Forbiddi

427

specifically banning riverboat gambling in South Carolina. '9 8 In either case, only time will tell what is "in the cards" for the future of
riverboat gambling cruises in South Carolina.
Shanna L. Peterson
198. See Justices Dea4, supra note 197 (stating that although United States Supreme Court denied certiorari without comment to Casino Ventures case, it did not
address fact that South Carolina legislators have not enacted ban on riverboat gambling). For a further discussion of potential legislative action, see supra notes 7678, 128-30, 173-75, 193-94 and accompanying text.
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